

Alfred C. Sharpe's prize winning essay of 1887.

Essay submissions to the Journal of the Military Service Institution, competing for the prize, were not signed with the author's name, in order to guarantee impartiality by the judges. Each essay's author was given a code name, with his real name being revealed only after the judging was over.

Alfred C. Sharpe's essay was given the author code name of "Landsturm 54".

Upon winning the prize, Sharpe's name was added to his essay, and the essay was printed in the 1889 issue of the Journal.

The following pages present Sharpe's winning essay as it was printed in the Journal, followed by his accompanying notes.

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Prize Essay.

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF A NATIONAL
RESERVE FOR MILITARY SERVICE.

BY FIRST LIEUT. A. C. SHARPE, U. S. A.,
TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

*"The legacy that will be left by such men as Sheridan, Grant, Sherman and Lee is this: that volunteers may be trusted, but it is madness to leave them untrained and unprepared."**

INTRODUCTORY.

IN the ancient monarchies of Europe, the manners and customs of the times sufficiently prepared the great body of the people for War. Every citizen was a soldier, as the exigencies of the State demanded. Each one provided his own arms and maintained himself without expense to the Crown. Military weapons were rude and simple, and skill in their use was readily acquired. In Greece and Rome military training was made a necessary part of the education of the youth and imposed by the State upon every free citizen. We discover also in the Feudal governments, which arose upon the ruins of the Roman Empire, many similar ordinances for the encouragement of skill in archery and other martial exercises. And although military training seems to have gradually gone into disuse among

* *London Globe*, on the death of Gen. Sheridan, Aug. 7, 1888.

the great body of the people, the universal obligation to military duty was never relaxed as a fundamental principle of government. In the earliest colonial charters we find it provided that "the inhabitants and free men above seventeen years of age and under sixty, shall be bound to bear arms and serve as soldiers whenever the grand council shall find it necessary."¹ But with the increasing population and development of the industrial arts, together with the resulting division of labor and the more careful and laborious training required to prepare for War, it became manifestly impracticable to train the whole people. However natural and just it might appear that all should be liable to military service, expediency demanded that a portion only should be selected for this necessary public duty, and that while thus withdrawn from the productive resources of the country, the burden of their maintenance should be borne by those who were exempted. Thus conscription, although exceedingly repugnant to a free people, became the truly democratic mode of raising an army. In England and among the Anglo-American colonists, the memory of Charles the First and of the Long Parliament, had possessed the people with an overmastering dread of a standing army and the subsequent oppressive measures of the home government, which finally culminated in the great uprising of '76, confirmed their descendants in this deep-rooted antipathy. The quartering of troops upon them, without their consent, was by no means the least of the grievances complained of in the Declaration of Independence. The conscriptive system, however, proved, in the long struggle which followed, to be utterly unreliable and ineffective. Washington repeatedly inveighed against it, and General Lee, in a letter to James Bowdoin, President of the Council of Massachusetts, wrote as early as November, 1776, "As to your Militia, they are grown more detestable than ever."² The necessity for a more permanent military establishment was manifest to every officer of the Revolution, but when confronted with the alternative of a militia or a standing army, the people unhesitatingly chose the former, and although we perceive nothing in the written Constitution then framed, or in the amendments subsequently added, which imposes the least restraint upon the creation and development of a standing army, the material augmentation of that force in time of Peace is an event which the youngest among us can scarcely expect to see. Success in several wars, however providentially achieved and at

—no matter what—cost, has inflated us with an overweening sense of security and invincibility. Matthew Arnold pronounced us the most boastful people in the world,³ and the words of De Tocqueville may be applied with equal force: “No nation was ever more prodigal of self-applause; no people ever better satisfied with themselves.” While it is therefore true, as the last-named writer observes, that “a democratic people is led by its own tastes to centralize its Government,” and that its leaders “will labor unceasingly to extend the powers of government,” we may for that very reason always anticipate the opposition of a formidable minority—expressing the fears and prejudices of the people—ever actively imposing a wholesome restraint. The effect of the great Rebellion has certainly been an increasing tendency towards strong government, yet the *posse comitatus* act of 1878 shows how sensitive the people are to the most distant encroachments of executive power.

We may assume, therefore, at the outset, and without reference to the powers and limitations prescribed by the Constitution, that the creation by Congress of a powerful effective National Reserve Force will be hedged about with many jealous provisos and its availability to the Executive authority made dependent upon what at least appears to be remote and improbable contingencies. Bearing in mind, then, the two fundamental political maxims which our people never weary of repeating, that a standing army is dangerous to the liberties of the Republic, and that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State, let us proceed to a statement of the Constitutional powers and limitations under and within which a National Reserve may be organized and trained.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

The Constitutional provisions affecting the subject under consideration are the following:

The Congress shall have power to declare War.

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the U. S., or in any department or officer thereof. (Article I, Section 8.)

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, keep troops or ships of war in time of Peace, or engage in War unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. (Article I, Section 10.)

The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the U. S. (Article 2, Section 2.)

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of government and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the Legislature or the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. (Article 4, Section 4.)

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. (2d Amendment.)

No soldier shall in time of Peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner nor in time of War, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. (3d Amendment.)

RETROSPECTIVE.

Before entering upon the discussion of any plan for the future, it may not be without advantage to look to the past and to inquire briefly what, if anything, has been done or projected, by those who have gone before us, looking to the formation of a National Reserve.

The Constitution of the United States was framed one hundred years ago. In ten years prior to that event, the Union had existed as a confederation of sovereign States, bound together by a veritable rope of sand. No provision had been made by the articles of confederation for enrolling or calling forth the Militia, which proved to be an omission seriously felt. Our population at that time was sparse and our frontier exposed to the incursions of numerous powerful tribes of Indians. There was also cause to apprehend that serious dissensions with England might be renewed in consequence of unsettled questions still pending between the two countries. Seeing that there was an insuperable aversion on the part of the people to maintaining a regular army, President Washington took repeated occasion to impress on Congress the necessity of organizing a reserve force without further delay. In his speech at the opening of the second session, he said that, "among the interesting objects that should engage the attention of Congress, that of providing for the common defense would merit its particular regard. To be prepared for War is one of the most effectual means of preserving Peace." Under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress by resolutions

of April 12, 1785, and October 3, 1787, had created and continued a military peace force for service against Indians, and by one of the earliest acts of the First Congress (Sept. 29, 1789), the establishment of 1787, "except as to the mode of appointing officers, was recognized to be the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States." By this Act also, the President was "authorized to call into service from time to time such part of the Militia of the States, respectively, as he may judge necessary for the purpose aforesaid" (*i. e.* for protection against Indians). But this act was "to continue in force until the end of the next session of Congress, and no longer." These temporary expedients, however, proved entirely unsatisfactory, and notwithstanding the extreme caution which characterized the military legislation of the time, an act was finally passed on the 30th of April, 1790, which repealed the former statutes and substituted a force of 1216 men, exclusive of officers, to be organized into one regiment of infantry and a battalion of artillery. This was the beginning of the Regular Army. This Act retained the provision of the old law for calling forth the Militia, but it was not until two years later (May 8, 1792,) that the first bill was passed for the general military training of the people. It was provided by this statute that "each and every free, able-bodied, white, male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of 18 years and under the age of 45 years (except as hereinafter excepted), shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the Militia." The method of the enrollment was prescribed, and it was directed that every person so notified should within six months thereafter provide himself with suitable arms and accoutrements. The organization to be effected was described in this Act in detail, and it was provided that "within one year after the passing of this Act, the Militia shall be organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, as the Legislature of each State shall direct." Colors were to be provided by the field-officers, and drums, fifes and bugle-horns were to be supplied from the purses of the company officers. In each State, an Adjutant-General was to be appointed, and his duties toward the General Government were indicated. Independent corps of artillery, cavalry and infantry, then in existence, were recognized and made subject to the Act, being graciously permitted, however, "to retain their accustomed privileges."

Six months, in those days of sail and wagon transportation, was an exceedingly limited time in which to gather together the munitions of war. The Revolutionary conflict had ended eight years before, and the arms and accoutrements were scattered. Attics, closets and cellars had to be ransacked for "the good musket or fire-lock; sufficient bayonet and belt, spare flints and knapsack." Moreover, it was a proviso of the Act referred to that, from and after five years, all muskets in the hands of militiamen should be of a uniform caliber. To meet this requirement, which it was found quite impossible to comply with, Congress, in 1798, authorized the purchase of thirty thousand stand of arms at a cost of \$400,000, "for the purpose of being sold to the governments of the respective States or the Militia thereof." The Congress still clung to the ancient idea that the soldier must arm himself at his own expense. A slight relaxation of this principle, however, is observed in a later clause of the same Act, by which it was further declared that should any of the arms remain unsold, the President was authorized to loan them to the Militia when called into the service of the United States, "proper receipts and security being given for the return of the same." By the Act of March 2, 1803, it was made the duty of the Adjutant-General in each State to make annual return of the Militia of the State to which he belonged, with their arms, accoutrements and ammunition; and the Secretary of War was required to give such directions to the Adjutants-General of the Militia "as shall in his opinion be necessary to produce an uniformity in said returns," and to lay an abstract of the same before Congress each year. This law also added a Quartermaster-General to the organization in each State. The burden of furnishing arms and accoutrements, at their personal expense, had always been complained of by the militiamen as a very unequal tax; the opposition finally attained such proportions as to lead to the adoption of a measure for their partial relief. On the 23d of April, 1808, a bill was approved making an annual appropriation of \$200,000 for the purpose of providing arms and military equipments for the whole body of the Militia, to be transmitted to the several States and Territories in proportion to the number of effective Militia therein. Slight changes in organization, suggested by the recent war experience, were made by the acts of 18th April, 1814, and 20th April, 1816, and by the Act of May 12, 1820, it was directed that the system of discipline and field exer-

cises, which is and shall be ordered to be observed by the Regular Army of the United States in the different corps of Infantry, Artillery and Riflemen, shall also be observed by the Militia in the exercises and discipline of the said corps, respectively, throughout the United States.

Various statutes were also passed (Feb. 28, 1795,) indicating the circumstances under which it shall be lawful for the President to call forth the Militia, prescribing penalties for disregarding the call and the method of levying fines (April 20, 1818); providing for payment of necessary expenses in assembling the Militia pursuant to a requisition of the President (March 19th, 1836, Seminole War period); allowing to militia in actual service the same pay, rations, clothing, forage and camp equipage, as is allowed to the Army, and (June 18, 1846, Mexican War period) prescribing the money allowance for clothing and transportation of militia troops in service, and authorizing the President to appoint certain additional staff-officers to continue in service "only so long as they shall be required in connection with the Militia and Volunteers." In 1855, the annual distribution of arms was changed to accord with the number of representatives in Congress from each State, the distribution to the Territories being left to the discretion of the President: and the first year's experience in the Civil War led Congress to provide (Act, July 17, 1862,) that the Militia when called into service shall be organized "in the mode prescribed by law for volunteers." Finally, on the 2d of March, 1867, the original Act of 1792 was amended by striking out the word "white," thus extending the obligation to military service to all able-bodied men of military age without regard to race, color or condition. The defenceless state of our coast frontier and the increasing interest in military training in the various States were again recognized in the councils of the nation by Act of May 19, 1882, whereby an appropriation of \$5000 for heavy ordnance was made to each coast or gulf State having a permanent camp-ground and an annual encampment of not less than six days, and by Act of February 11, 1887, the appropriation of \$200,000 made in 1808, was increased to \$400,000, and extended to include quartermaster's stores and camp equipage.

The system inaugurated in 1792 continued in actual operation during the first half century of our national existence, but with the growth of population and wealth, and the inclinations of the

people to the pursuits of peace, it grew more irksome year by year. The list of exemptions daily increased, and means were sought on every hand to evade its requirements. The practice of hiring substitutes, which obtained in Great Britain, and which had prevailed in the War of 1812, adhered to the Militia after the termination of that conflict; and the legislatures of the States found various pretexts whereby to reduce the military age.⁷ The inequality of the burdens imposed by the system, and the general inefficiency of the Militia, became a subject of such general concern as to induce President Adams in a message to Congress in 1828, to invite the attention of that body to its serious consideration. The Committee on Military Affairs in the House, to whom that part of the message had been referred, brought in a carefully prepared report from which it will not be uninteresting to make a brief extract. After declaring their conviction that a well organized and efficient national militia is not only the most appropriate defence of a free, high-minded and enlightened people, but that it would, therefore, form the greatest safeguard of these United States, the committee go on to say that, "in the discharge of the duty assigned them, they have with unwearied diligence sought to avail themselves of all the light shed upon the important subject by the expressed opinions of experienced and distinguished military men, and reports of intelligent committees of both Houses of Congress. In the progress of their investigations they find that the division of constitutional powers which was made by the framers of our great national compact, under the influence of a provident jealousy of the people's rights, was not without its embarrassing effects. Studiously avoiding any innovation upon the rights so clearly reserved to the States by the Constitution, the committee have anxiously labored to give effect to the powers which are so clearly granted to Congress by that instrument. The first important branch of the general subject which engaged the attention and reflection of the committee is the suggested necessity of an officer to serve as a point of concentration of all reports, exhibits, returns, and other useful information relating to the whole Militia of the United States. Satisfied of the indispensable necessity of such an office, the committee respectfully recommends its creation. * * * An increase of the annual appropriation for arming the Militia is recommended. * * * To carry into successful effect the grant of constitutional power which authorizes Congress to provide for

disciplining the Militia, the committee propose to hold out inducements to the several States and Territories, to authorize and require by legislative enactments of the legislatures of the States and Territories respectively, an annual convocation of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and musicians, to be encamped in their respective States and Territories a specified length of time, for the purpose of being trained by proper instructors. * * * That the system proposed is but an experiment, to test which will cost the United States a million and a half or two millions of dollars, is an argument which ought not to be permitted to countervail its proposed adoption. The present period, with its attendant circumstances, seems peculiarly propitious to the proposed organization. Already have propositions novel and experimental in their character, to dispose of an anticipated burdensome surplus in the Treasury of the United States, been presented to Congress for consideration. If such anticipations are well founded, the claim of the Militia of the United States to a liberal share of such surplus is irresistible." The committee conclude by submitting a bill providing for a division of the Militia into two classes, the junior class to include the ages 21 to 28, and to be first for duty: the senior class to include all others to 40 years. Annual encampments, as suggested in the report, of not less than six nor more than ten days were also provided for. Recommendations of a similar nature had been made several years before by a Board of Militia and Army officers which was convened at Washington in 1826. This board, of which General Winfield Scott was president, and Lieut.-Col. Zachary Taylor a member, proposed the appointment of an "Adjutant General for the Militia of the United States," and submitted a plan for 104 divisional encampments of ten days' duration for the instruction of officers and non-commissioned officers in the various States. The board estimated 16,758 officers, after deducting surgeons (retaining one for each camp), and allowing one-sixth for absentees. They recommended a per diem of \$1.50 to each man present, a mileage allowance of \$2.50, and one tent to four men. Allowing \$11,500 for instruction and music, and supposing the tents to continue serviceable for eight years, they estimated the total annual cost of the camps at \$318,123. The board also suggested "that it be made the duty of the Secretary of War, on application made by the Executives of the several States, to provide competent instructors, and as far as practicable by selec-

tion from officers of the Army or graduates of the United States Military Academy." Recommendations were also made to furnish the Militia with elementary military text-books, pursuant to which, by Act of March 2, 1829, sixty thousand copies of Infantry Tactics and five thousand copies of Artillery Tactics were published and distributed to the Militia. In January, 1831, a convention of Massachusetts Militia officers met at Boston, and submitted a memorial to Congress praying that an effective and uniform system be adopted for the regulation and government of the Militia of the United States. The patience of these memorialists seems to have been quite exhausted by the inaction of Congress and the restrictions imposed by the Constitution. They declare that "of all the checks upon the different branches of authority in our government, none appear at first sight to be more incongruous than those which relate to the Militia."⁸ The State Legislatures were also aroused, and we find the Maine Legislature in 1833 resolving "that our Senators in Congress be and they are hereby instructed, and our Representatives requested to use their exertions, both by their votes and their influence, to procure the passage of a law providing for a more perfect and uniform organization of the Militia of the several States of the Union."⁹ Similar resolutions came up about the same time from the legislatures of New York and New Hampshire, followed by Indiana and other States a few years later.⁹ It was becoming a crystallized conviction with the people that an effective reserve force could never be created by conscription. The whole system was becoming impracticable; in truth, its collapse had been foreseen and predicted from a very early day. A gentleman of Pennsylvania, replying to a circular letter from the Secretary of War in 1826, declared that "at no very distant time we shall probably have a body of State troops, but in the meanwhile upon the Militia no reliance can be placed. My only hope is in the Volunteer."⁸

As the Militia fell into disrepute it was gradually abandoned by the more spirited young men of the community who organized themselves into select corps, chose officers to their liking, and adopted rules and regulations for the government of their members.¹⁰ Thus Virginia had in 1827, over twenty-three thousand uniformed volunteers against seventy-five thousand regular or conscripted militia. In course of time the Militia system came to be almost wholly disregarded, and finally by

common consent it disappeared altogether. The arms, rapidly growing obsolete, were left to rust in arsenals, and those belonging to volunteer companies and individuals were stowed away in garrets and cellars; the "cornstalk" Militia soon became only a memory."

Passing over the war period of 1861-5, we perceive issuing from the smoke and flame of that terrific conflict "a wise and understanding people," scourged to the limit of endurance for their negligences in the past, and resolved that the calamity of war and civil discord should never find them so unprepared again. This influence and the necessity for a reserve police force resulted in the organization of a Volunteer National Guard in all the States of the Union. These troops now aggregate a force, uniformed, armed and equipped, of over one hundred thousand men. Referring to these forces the Adjutant-General of New York, in his last annual report,¹² says, "The Militia of the Constitution is a theory of the last century, * * * without any aid from the National Government the volunteer military organization which have grown in many States, variously known as State Troops and National Guards, by the rapid progress they have made in matters of organization, discipline and the use of arms, as well as by the proofs they have given, that under proper auspices they may be depended on for service, have solved the problem which puzzled the National legislature and given us a force sufficiently national in its character, but at the same time not obnoxious to the prejudices which obtain against a centralized force or standing army."

THE NATIONAL RESERVE IN FUTURE.

Having briefly outlined the policy and efforts of the past, let us now endeavor to construct a system for the future. Referring to the powers reposed in Congress by the Constitution, we observe that whatever is accomplished in this regard must be done either under the authority "to raise and support armies," or "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia," or both. A force enlisted, organized and trained under the first grant would possess many obvious advantages. Its officers would be appointed by the President and thus not subject to the caprices of the elective system now prevalent in the National Guard. Their first duty and allegiance would be to the General Government and not merely available through the indirect

agency of the State. The training, discipline and entire control of the force would be subject to one central authority, and the moral influence of a great reserve would be at all times instantly available to the Executive. It would, in fact, be a part of the Regular Army, and could eventually be brought to as high a standard of excellence. Being under a central authority the great losses now sustained by the State organizations due to changes of residence, would be obviated.¹³ Any change of domicile within the United States would only affect a transfer of the soldier to another company and would not, therefore, operate as a discharge. The cost of maintenance under a central administration would doubtless be more economical and certainly would not exceed the aggregate now expended by the various States for military purposes. It would be a legitimate means of relieving the Treasury by allowing the surplus to flow back to the people. The strength of the Reserve could be increased by this scheme to any desired extent, by retiring the active reserve after three or four years' service to a sedentary reserve, and finally to a territorial reserve or *landsturm* as in France and Germany. Finally, all apprehension of executive abuse of the great power so created would be banished by sufficient statutory provisos, limiting the assembling of the force in peace to small detachments and at widely separated places and periods of time. But, however desirable the creation of a centralized force may be in the interests of strong government and diplomacy, and however plausible the plan of the organization and training may appear (and it certainly is not without support, if the bill¹⁴ recently introduced into the Senate on this subject means anything), it seems to be wholly and utterly impracticable. It would be regarded as an attempt to supplant the National Guard of the States, and, if successful, it would undoubtedly have that effect. For this, if for no other reason, it would excite the jealous alarm and opposition of every National Guardsman now on the rolls, and as a result, would not receive the support of fifty votes in the national House of Representatives. Again, it would be impracticable because of the direct appropriations required to support it. It is estimated that over six million dollars¹⁵ are annually expended in the United States for the maintenance of the present organization of one hundred thousand men, and a less force would scarcely be recognized as a sufficient Reserve. Many of the States now own fine armories, yet the item for rent alone is still nearly a million of

dollars. Nearly all the States now provide for annual encampments for the modest period of from five to eight days. The pay for the troops in these camps—and all are not paid—amounts to about one million more. The annual appropriation of the single State of Massachusetts for military purposes is over one hundred and fifty thousand dollars,¹⁶ and yet admitting the excellent results already attained in that public-spirited Commonwealth no one pretends to say that all has been done that need be done to secure the desired standard of proficiency. It may be answered that the sum named is but a paltry consideration, and even though doubled would be a small premium for the insurance of peace secured by the existence of so efficient a force as it would provide. This is undoubtedly true, and no nation in the world has more reason than we to lament the ruinous policy of being “more saving of Peace taxes than of War debt.”¹⁷ But as Adam Smith declares, “Nations are never impoverished by private but public prodigality,” and our people have never been willing, even when burdened with a great surplus, to make an investment which does not promise an immediate, palpable, return. Except when confronted with the imminent prospect of war, the national provision for the common defense has been characterized by a withering parsimony. And with the frequent return of our Representatives to seek the endorsement of their constituents, we cannot expect to see an early or notable change in this regard. No public measure can meet with success in advance of the popular sentiment affecting it. Indeed, it is believed that if the maintenance of the National Guard of the States were dependent wholly upon direct legislative appropriation, the system could scarcely be held together. Various devices are resorted to, such as a commutation poll tax, exemption from jury duty and road tax, and imposing upon counties the charges for erection or rent of armories, fuel, lights, etc., in order to distribute the cost among the people in small sums, which in the aggregate would never reach a second reading if embodied in a bill in the Legislature.¹⁸ Such is the spirit of our people, and although it may not be contemplated without regret by the professional soldier, the formation of a great Federal Reserve under the authority to raise and support armies and in which the State authorities shall exercise no control, is an event which the present generation is not likely to see.

Turning now to the second grant we observe that Congress

has power "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia,"¹⁹ and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of officers and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." We have followed the efforts of the fathers to exercise this power, and traced the rise, decline and fall of their ambitious system. In its stead we find to-day in the various States and Territories an aggregate force of 106,814 men,²⁰ brought together by voluntary enlistments under statutory provisions of the respective States, and armed, uniformed and instructed without material assistance from the General Government. In many of the States the oath²¹ of enlistment binds them to support the Constitution of the United States, and "to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever." These troops are well organized and equipped, and many of them have attained a degree of proficiency and smartness in the drill-book beyond which it is not desirable to go. They are ready to enter upon a higher and more advanced course of instruction, and now stand knocking at the door of Uncle Sam asking for professional support and co-operation. For the most part they are composed of the representative young men of the nation, and enjoy the confidence and good-will of the people. Their numbers are increasing year by year, and could be augmented to any desired limit with slight encouragement.²² Irresistibly we are drawn to the conclusion that here is the true National Reserve—the only practicable organization which can be availed of under our form of government with our kind of people. Let us proceed then to an investigation of this force and of the methods whereby it may be made available. The latest official return²³ shows the following distribution of the National Guard among the States:

ABSTRACT OF THE RETURN OF THE REGULARLY ENLISTED,
ORGANIZED AND UNIFORMED ACTIVE MILITIA OF THE UNITED
STATES, JULY 2, 1888.

Alabama	2244	Florida	1171
Arkansas, no return.		Georgia.....	4566
California	4417	Illinois.....	4150
Colorado	1153	Indiana.....	2184
Connecticut	2573	Iowa.....	2693
Delaware.....	709	Kansas	1966

Kentucky	1336	Rhode Island	1156
Louisiana	2017	South Carolina	4844
Maine	968	Tennessee	1557
Maryland	2016	Texas	2556
Massachusetts	5046	Vermont	792
Michigan	3012	Virginia	2875
Minnesota	1796	West Virginia	869
Mississippi	1389	Wisconsin	2092
Missouri	2151	Dakota	992
Nebraska	1222	Montana	623
Nevada	362	New Mexico	1735
New Hampshire	1236	Washington	890
New Jersey	3947	Wyoming	48
New York	13,230	District of Columbia	1189
North Carolina	1314	Arizona)	
Ohio	5626	Idaho) Have no organized militia.	
Oregon	1557	Utah)	
Pennsylvania	8545		
Aggregate States	101,337		
Aggregate Territories and District of Columbia	5,477		
Grand Aggregate	106,814		

This force is organized into infantry, artillery and cavalry, as follows, exclusive of commissioned officers—8442 :

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>
States,	84,456	5074	3890
Ter. and D. C.,	3262	100	1590
Totals,	87,718	5174	5480

The cavalry is found principally in the Southern States and Territories, South Carolina having 1480 and New Mexico 1342. The five States of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Texas contain an aggregate of 2639 troopers, and these added to the force of New Mexico constitute over seventy per cent. of the entire cavalry force. Massachusetts and the District of Columbia have also organized small signal corps, and in the former a detachment of twenty-six men constitute an ambulance corps. The statutes of the several States under which these forces are maintained generally provide that their organization shall conform as nearly as practicable to that which is or may be prescribed for the United States Army, and we find a tendency throughout the Union to adopt the uniform, regulations and customs of the Regular Service. Could any probability be more attractive or promising than the ultimate molding of these zealous, public-spirited and patriotic State forces into a splendid National Reserve?

ORGANIZATION.

The President is Constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Militia when called into the actual service of the United States, but can be clothed with power to call them into such service only "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;" and while Congress has the authority to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, it can regulate the government of only such part of them as may be so called by the President into actual service. If, therefore, the Militia or any part of it (as the active militia or National Guard) is to be brought under the authority and control of the national executive power in time of public tranquility, and for any other purpose than to execute the laws of the Union, or to suppress or anticipate insurrections and repel invasions, it can be accomplished only by and through a mutual agreement between the Government on the one hand and the States on the other, whereby the rights reserved to the States shall not be put in jeopardy, and yet the authority of the General Government for the time being sufficiently established. And this is believed to be entirely practicable. The availability of such a force in the event of War could be as readily secured as it is now in the several States, by the statutes of which it is provided that the organized troops in case of public disturbance shall be the first for service.²³

Following the suggestion of the Scott Board of 1826, the first step in the organization of the Reserve would seem to be the detail, or better, the appointment, of an Adjutant-General of Reserve, whose office should be in the War Department, and whose duties should comprise those relating to the Militia now performed by the Adjutant-General of the Army, together with all matters connected with the organization, instruction and discipline of the Reserve, as might be provided by Congress. He should have the rank, pay, and allowances of a Brigadier-General, and be selected from the permanent establishment. In like manner there should be detailed or appointed a Paymaster-General, an Inspector-General and a Quartermaster-General, the last-named officer acting also as Commissary-General of Reserve. These officers should have a sufficient corps of assistants to be designated as Acting Assistant Adjutants-General, etc., of Reserve, one-half of whom would be detailed from the Army, and one-half from the Reserve, but no officer should be detailed for this or any other staff duty who had not served as a commissioned offi-

cer for at least three years. The officers performing this duty should have the rank of Captain of Cavalry and details should be limited to four or five years. All selections for this duty should be made by the chiefs of departments upon the recommendation of their subordinates. Upon the request of the Governor of any State having not less than two hundred officers and men enrolled in the National Reserve, for every Representative from the State in Congress, and upon a like request from the Governor of any Territory having not less than one thousand men enrolled, there should be detailed an officer of the Army to act as Assistant Adjutant- and Inspector-General and Military Instructor, whose duty it should be under the direction of the Governor of the State or Territory to superintend and direct the instruction and drill of the officers and men of the Reserve in the State to which he may be assigned. This officer should visit the armories during the year, lecture to the officers and non-commissioned officers, observe the drill and assist the commanders by proper criticism and suggestion in the discharge of their duties. "The efficiency of an army," wrote Gen. Gaines a half-century ago, "mainly depends upon the character and qualifications of the captains of companies and commandants of regiments," to which Gen. Sherman has added, "The company is the basis of all good armies."²⁴ In modern War the intelligence and discipline of subordinate commanders is become the paramount consideration. An able military critic has said, "Formerly the deficiencies of the individual were to a large extent lost in the impulse of the mass. But now the initiative, once always exercised by the chief, has largely to be left to the Corporal and Captain. The battalion has become of far more consequence than the brigade."²⁵ Those who have had occasion to closely observe the National Guard, have remarked a tendency to slight the elementary instruction. The men have the spirit but not always the appearance of soldiers; they need more setting up, more squad drill, more saluting and standing at attention. A competent young officer as instructor would soon correct these defects, but great care should be exercised in his selection. If possible in our form of government, personal and political and social influence in this instance at least should be held in abeyance. The detail of an efficient officer in this capacity would doubtless be welcomed in every State.²⁶ It should also be made his duty to accumulate information embracing all subjects of military deficiency and the means

of supply within his State tending to a full development of the military resources, local and disposable, of every section of the country. The information thus collected should be classified and reported to the Adjutant-General of Reserve, thus enabling the Government on the sudden approach of War to comprehend at once the actual force and means of supply directly applicable to the defense of any and every assailable point on the National frontier.

Congress should provide that all regularly-organized, uniformed and equipped active militia or National Guard now in existence, or which may hereafter be properly organized under the statutory authority of the several States and Territories, should be eligible to enrollment in a force to be known as the National Reserve of the United States. Any organization desiring to be enrolled should transmit an application through the Adjutant-General of Reserve, who, upon satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the organization, and with the approval of the Adjutant-General of the State should cause it to be enrolled.²⁷ But no independent company, battery or troop not belonging to the organized State Militia should be eligible.²⁸

The staff, troops, batteries, companies and regiments of the Reserve should have the same organization and practically the same strength as that which is or may be prescribed for the Army. Infantry regiments should, however, consist of three battalions of four companies each, and to each battalion of four companies or less, there should be one Major. Each regiment should have one Surgeon, one Assistant Surgeon, one Chaplain, one Commissary Sergeant, and one Hospital Steward; and to each battery there should be one Assistant Surgeon, and to each troop and battery one Veterinary Surgeon. This is the organization now existing in most of the States. Brigades and divisions should be organized under the direction of the Commanding-General of the Army. Major-Generals should be selected and appointed by the President from among the Brigadier-Generals of the Geographical Division (to be hereafter indicated,) in which they may reside, and Brigadier-Generals should in like manner be appointed from among the Colonels of the particular geographical districts. Field officers should be elected by the written ballots of the commissioned officers of companies of their respective regiments and company officers by the written ballots of the members of their respective companies. All officers below the

rank of Brigadier-General should be commissioned by the Governors of the respective States in which the officers are located, but commissions so issued should expire in five years.

Non-commissioned officers should be appointed by their immediate commanders, and regimental staff officers by the commanders of regiments.

The elective system may not be regarded with favor, but it prevails in nearly all the States, and, indeed, is imposed by specific clauses in various State Constitutions.²⁹ It has also been adopted by Congress for the Militia of the Territories.³⁰ It is so deeply imbedded in the habits and affections of the people that no other method would now be practicable. At the worst it will certainly not be found an unmixed evil, for, as a sagacious observer has said, "Bodies of men are quick in discerning traits of character, courage, firmness, dash and endurance, and it is just here that competitive examinations fail."³¹ To eliminate as far as possible the evil features of the elective system whereby incompetent and unworthy men are sometimes elevated to office, all officers should be required to pass an examination before a board duly constituted in each State for this purpose. The Acting Assistant Adjutant-General should be *ex-officio* President of this Board, and it should convene at least twice in each year.³² The National Reserve members of this Board should be allowed a sufficient per diem and mileage in the discharge of this duty.

All officers of the National Reserve should be retired (honorably discharged) for age as follows:

General officers at 60. Field officers at 55. Captains at 45. Subalterns at 40. Every commissioned officer in whose hands public money or property issued by the General Government for the maintenance of the National Reserve shall be placed, should be required to give sufficient bonds, conditioned safely to account for the same.³³

Enlistments should be for three years, but no enlistment should be made within a period of six months next preceding the annual encampment in which the soldier is to participate.³⁴ No person should be enlisted who is under sixteen or over twenty-seven years of age. A period of six months would thus be afforded for recruitment, and the retirements for age and by expiration of service would not exceed the losses now sustained, while we should at the same time secure vigor, activity and an encouraging flow of promotion.³⁵ Every member of the National

Reserve should take and subscribe to an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States and to the State in which the enlistment is made, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever. It should also be provided and made a part of the enlistment contract, that the National Reserve should be the first for duty in all cases requiring the services of troops in addition to those of the permanent establishment.²³ To allay captious opposition or possible serious apprehension, it should be further provided that no Reserve troops shall be paraded in time of Peace under the authority of the President on Election or Inauguration Day except as now provided by law.

For all police purposes in aid of the civil authority the Reserve troops, except when called into the active service of the United States, should remain under the authority and subject to the orders of the Governors of the respective States.

UNIFORM.

The fatigue uniform of the United States Army, including shoes, should be adopted for the Reserve. The State troops now generally have this uniform, substituting the State button. In New York the coat consists of a double breasted dark blue sack, but nearly all the regiments supplement it at their own expense with blouses.²⁶ No dress uniform need be prescribed. In the Western States, where the National Guard is still young, it would gradually conform to that of the army.²⁷

ARMS.

Arms and equipments should also conform to those of the Regular Service. Quite, if not all of the State troops are provided with the cartridge box and knapsack. These would doubtless be discarded, as both cumbersome and physically injurious in a protracted campaign, but for the brief periods of service for which they would be required in training, and because of some obvious advantages they present for police duty in State service, they may be undisturbed for the present. The New York troops still carry the 50 calibre Remington, and some of the cavalry in other States are armed with Sharp's carbines, but though the allotment from the Ordnance Department is very meager, the remaining States are now generally supplied with the Springfield weapon. Field artillery being at a period of transition it will not be wise to

increase that arm beyond the resources, obsolete as they are, now at hand. There should, however, be to every brigade organization one battery of Gatling guns, "those hybrid monsters whose definite assignment to some arm is still an undetermined question in our service." In each coast and Gulf State there should be two companies of heavy artillery. The instruction of these companies should be carried forward at the various forts and landing-places along the coast in a manner similar to that pursued by the New York troops at Fort Wadsworth, and where no permanent works are available, siege-gun and mortar batteries should be constructed similar to those at the State camp-grounds in Louisiana, Massachusetts and Connecticut. It has been suggested that Fort Independence in Boston Harbor could be turned over to the Militia temporarily for this instruction, but where no available works exist, provision should be made for their construction sufficiently near to the armories to be accessible at all seasons of the year.³⁸ Armories of the heavy artillery companies should be furnished with dummies, and those of light batteries and cavalry troops with wooden horses. The necessary implements and projectiles actually used in service should be handled in the instruction at heavy gun dummies. The men could thus be made familiar with the system during the winter months.

ELEMENTARY INSTRUCTION.

By the statutes or regulations of those States having the best developed systems of administration, we find it provided that there shall be stated drills each month, and a scale of fines for delinquencies is established by the Company Council of Administration subject to approval by higher authority. Commanding officers are authorized to cause the arrest of any delinquent and bring him to trial before a court of inquiry, and if he refuse to pay the fine adjudged, it is made the duty of any justice of the township before whom the matter is brought to render judgment and issue execution without stay, and the fine so adjudged is made collectable without exemption.³⁹ This article of discipline should be imposed by law upon the Reserve, but the method of levying fines and the details of all other matters of internal administration, such as the creation and disbursement of a regimental or company fund, the support of bands, rent, or erection of armories, and the charges of furnishing, lighting, heating and caring for the same, and for the safe keeping of arms, clothing

and accoutrements, should be required to be provided for by the legislatures of the respective States. These matters are now generally and in many cases handsomely provided for in all the States; but all armories should be subject to inspection by the Inspector-General or other detailed officer of the Reserve, and no armory accepted which was not of ample proportions. Every officer and man should be required to drill at least once each month, and during a period of three months each year there should be a non-commissioned officers' school, one hour each week.

CLOTHING AND BLANKETS.

Uniforms and blankets should be furnished by the States, and no National Guardsman should be accepted in the Reserve who is not supplied with both. The States prefer to furnish them, and no abuse could arise that would not speedily be detected. Since the amendment of the Act providing arms, to include Quartermaster's stores, some of the States have drawn cloth for uniforms, but it is maintained by some that the States actually incur a loss of at least ten per cent. of their apportionment by reason of the reduced figure obtainable on the same goods at the mills by private contract. If furnished by the State, therefore, they might give better satisfaction, and would be as scrupulously cared for as if they were the property of the United States. The principal use to which they would be applied being in the service of the State, it is but just that the State should provide them.

PAY.

Every member of the National Reserve should receive compensation, not only during the period of his service in camps of instruction but throughout the year in armories." Length of service should also be rewarded by increase of pay. A monthly statement, sworn to by the First Sergeant of the company, and certified to by the Captain, should be forwarded to the Adjutant-General of Reserve, showing the number of men present at the required monthly drill during a full period of not less than two hours; also the number absent, reporting officers by name, and the number in attendance at non-commissioned officers' school. For each drill or recitation attended every member should receive the sum of twenty-five cents. The officer acting as instructor of the school should be paid fifty cents. The want of

some slight compensation is greatly felt and complained of, and there can be no doubt that this arrangement, a strict administration of fines, and the resulting *esprit de corps* would secure the attendance of every man in the organization. For a force of 100,000 officers and men at drill and 16,000 non-commissioned officers at schools, we should require an appropriation of about \$350,000. If such a proposition were submitted to the National Guard to-day it would probably be carried through the lower house of Congress with little opposition. For service in camp nearly all the States now provide a compensation, more or less liberal, depending perhaps on the price of labor in the particular community.⁴¹ It is believed that one dollar per day for privates and musicians, with subsistence, quarters and transportation, would be sufficient for service in camps of the National Reserve. Corporals and Sergeants should receive \$1.25, Non-Commissioned Staff and First Sergeants \$1.50, Subalterns \$2.00, Captains \$2.25, Field Officers \$2.50, and Regimental Commanders \$3.00.⁴² In the present force of National Guardsmen we find 5475 company officers. We may take one-third of these to be captains, giving 1825 Captains, 3650 Subalterns, and 1825 First Sergeants. The aggregate of non-commissioned officers is 17,162. Deducting 1825 First Sergeants, we have 15,337 Sergeants and Corporals. Of these about 800 are non-commissioned staff officers. There remain, then, 14,537 Sergeants and Corporals. Estimating one regimental organization to ten companies (a low estimate), and allowing one Surgeon (Major), one Assistant Surgeon (Captain), one Chaplain (Captain), and two staff officers paid as Captains, the total pay per day would be in round numbers \$110,000. For length of service officers and men should receive an increase of five per cent. for each period of three years' service.

SUBSISTENCE AND FORAGE.

Commutation of subsistence is allowed in many of the States, ranging from twenty to seventy-five cents per day. The issue of rations in kind would deprive the junior officers of the Supply Department of what they now regard their most important function, and would fail to give the desired satisfaction. The educational benefit must be regarded. An efficient staff can only be created by a practical and extended experience.

A poor quality of beef in a mess of volunteer soldiers would be very unpleasantly brought to the notice of a negligent com-

missary. If all responsibility could be referred to a higher and less accessible authority, the performance of his duties might soon become perfunctory. It is believed that a commutation of twenty-five cents per day should be allowed to each man actually present in camp, and that the funds should be transferred direct to battery, troop and company commanders. In like manner the funds of the quartermaster's department for horse hire, forage, etc., should be transferred to the regimental or camp quartermaster, and the supplies procured in open market. In camps of larger organizations, as brigades, the supplies should be procured and issued by a post or chief quartermaster or commissary, and the balance, if any, remaining at the end of the encampment, transferred in funds to the company commander.

ENCAMPMENTS.

The territory of the United States should be divided into twelve Military Districts; coast and Gulf States and those adjacent to the national frontier to be grouped together. Beginning with Maine these districts, together with the present Congressional representation and the organized forces in each would be as follows :

MILITARY DISTRICTS.

No.	States and Territories.	Congressmen.	Active Militia <i>now</i> in service.
1.	New England States.	26	11,771
2.	New York,	34	13,230
3.	Penn. and Delaware.	29	8,254
4.	New Jersey, Md., D.C., and Va.,	23	10,027
5.	N. C., S. C., Ga., and Fla.,	28	11,895
6.	Ala., Miss., La., and Texas,	32	8,206
7.	W. Va., Ky., and Tenn.,	25	3,762
8.	Ohio and Michigan,	32	8,638
9.	Illinois and Indiana,	33	6,334
10.	Iowa, Wis., Minn., Dak., Montana, Nebraska, and Wyo.,	31	9,418
11.	Ark., Missouri, Kansas, Colo., N. Mexico, and Utah,	29	7,005
12.	Ariz., California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho,	11	7,226

Each District should have an Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, an Acting Assistant Inspector-General, an Acting Assistant Paymaster-General and an Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General of Reserve. These officers should have the rank of Major; the Adjutant and Inspector-General should be continu-

ously on duty ; the others for such time in each year as might be required. The Inspector should be detailed from the Army and should familiarize himself with the various organizations of his District by personal visits during the year to armories and State encampments. All reports of officers detailed to inspect State encampments in his District, should be forwarded through him to the Inspector-General of Reserve.

Two adjacent Districts should constitute a geographical Division, and encampments should be State, District or Division, and National.

STATE ENCAMPMENTS.

State camps should continue for ten days in each year and be under the entire control of the State authorities, subject to inspection by the District Inspector-General or his assistants.⁴³ To every State encampment there should be detailed by the Adjutant-General of Reserve upon the application of the Adjutant-General or Executive of the State a competent instructor, either from the Army or from among the most efficient officers of the Reserve. Should any organization be found by the Inspector-General to be below a prescribed standard of efficiency, or be not properly provided with armory facilities and suitable uniform by the State, the Adjutant-General of Reserve should have authority, upon the recommendation of the Inspector-General, to muster it out of the Reserve.

DISTRICT ENCAMPMENTS.

There should be an annual encampment in each District to be composed of such organizations of the three arms in the District as might, in the judgment of the Inspector of the District, appear to be prepared for advanced instruction in the elementary principles of minor tactics. Each State in the District should, if practicable, be represented in this camp and the troops should be selected the preceding year from those making the best appearance in the State camps, but not more than forty per cent. of the aggregate strength in any State should be withdrawn for duty in District encampments.⁴⁴ There would thus remain under State control sixty per cent. for sudden emergencies. The District camp-ground should not be permanent, but should be changed from year to year to different points along the national frontier, or, in interior districts, along the principal water courses. The

site for camp should be selected by the Commanding-General of the Army, who should also detail a suitable officer of the Army to command each camp. All available troops of the Regular Army, except those detailed to National Encampments should be required to participate in District Encampments. In districts composed of sea-coast and Gulf States the encampments should be near landing-places, where practice in embarkation and landing of troops, rearing earth-works, practice with heavy artillery and co-operation with naval vessels could be secured. The methods of rapid concentration of troops at these points and familiarity with the military geography of the coast frontier and with the means of its defense would thus be secured. No attention should be paid to the nice distinctions of the drill-book, the troops selected for District camps being presumed to have attained in State camps and armories sufficient proficiency in this regard. As much time as possible should be devoted to "practical instruction in military engineering as applied to the construction of shelter-trenches, rifle pits, abattis, fascines, gabions," etc., and to reconnoissance, passage and defense of defiles, and the speedy preparation of means for crossing streams.⁴⁶ At least one day should be devoted to practical skirmish firing in the field, and lectures should be delivered to the officers by the commanding officer, and by a medical officer upon camp sanitation and care of troops in campaign.⁴⁶

Of the fourteen days allowed for District encampments, two would be consumed in assembling and returning home, and two Sundays would intervene, leaving but ten actual working days. This is in excess of the highest period authorized in any State, and although far too short to cover the desired course of instruction, is probably as long a time as officers and men could absent themselves from business.

BRIGADES AND DIVISIONS.

Many of the States now have their troops organized into brigades and in some instances, into divisions, with the usual complement of staff officers. In some cases these organizations are found to be very efficient.⁴⁷ While it is competent for Congress to prescribe the organization of the militia, these volunteer State troops, being maintained as a police force, should be permitted to retain the organization which to them may seem best. They will be found in general to conform to that of the Army. For

the instruction of the Reserve, provisional brigades should be formed each year of the troops selected for the District camps at least six months prior to the date of the encampment. The commander should be detailed from the Army or from the Reserve by the Commanding General of the Army. To render the Reserve immediately available permanent brigades and divisions should be organized, the commanders to be appointed as already indicated. The various staff officers should be selected as far as possible upon the recommendation of the Inspector-General of the District, from officers having experience in the same capacity of State organizations. These permanent organizations would be practically identical with those now existing, and in the West and South new brigades, when formed, would conform to the requirements of the Reserve.⁴⁸

For every District, Division or National encampment there should be detailed a Judge Advocate who, during the continuance of the camp should be vested with the jurisdiction of a local municipal court for a distance of one mile from the exterior guard or picket line. This jurisdiction should extend to all offences then and there committed against the peace and order of the camp, and its judgments and executions secured in such manner as the Legislature of the particular State might provide. The commanding officer of a camp should also be authorized to fix the limits of the military reservation to a distance one-half mile beyond the interior or police guard line of the camp, within which no person not connected officially with the camp should be permitted to enter without his consent. In general, visitors should be allowed in camp only on the afternoons of Saturday and Sunday. Troops of the Reserve should have the right of way in all streets and defiles, and officers and men should be privileged from arrest in going to, returning from, and while in attendance at camp.⁴⁹

NATIONAL ENCAMPMENTS.

The Adjutant-General of Reserve should each year select from the most proficient organization in attendance at the last District encampments a number of troops—not exceeding five thousand—to form a National Encampment. The location for this camp should be selected by the Commanding-General of the Army, who should also detail a general officer of the army as its Commander. The administrative and supply departments should be under the

control of the various staff departments of the Army with assistants detailed from the most capable officers and men of the Reserve. The National encampment should continue twenty-one days not including days of concentration and dispersion. Every District should be represented, and the course of instruction should aim to familiarize the troops with the duties and experiences of an actual campaign. Tentage and clothing should be reduced to a minimum, and the occupation and instruction of the troops in marching, reconnoissance, outpost duty, passage of streams, attack and defense of convoys, constructing hasty defenses, and, so far as possible, in the practical solution of problems in minor tactics, should be incessant and unremitting. The National encampment should be at some point on the Atlantic, Pacific or Gulf coast, or near the Canadian border, and every endeavor should be made to familiarize the officers and men with the topography of the country adjacent to the frontier. The time allotted—three weeks—is believed to be sufficient, and is as much as could be successfully required. It would require ten days for concentration and dispersion ; and one month's vacation is about as much as the young man of to-day can secure from business.

The wisdom of providing a National encampment may be questioned, but there can certainly be no influence so potent in securing uniformity and homogeneity in any organization, whether military or civic, as these annual assemblages. To be selected for the National camp would be a coveted distinction, yet within the reach of all, and it would enhance the military spirit of an organization immeasurably. If the Reserve is to be truly National in character, its members must be brought together, from time to time, under one common authority ; service for three weeks, elbow to elbow, in the field and bivouac will allay sectional prejudice, create new friendships, and weld the young soldiers of the Republic together indissolubly. The moral effect alone of such an experience would be far-reaching and enduring and well worthy of all the effort made in its behalf.

At the conclusion of each encampment, reports should be made to the Adjutant-General of the Reserve of the maneuvers and instruction had, together with the names of officers whose intelligence and efficiency merit special commendation. These reports should be transmitted to the Secretary of War to be laid before Congress.

The transportation of troops to State encampments should be

provided by the States themselves. Such provision is now made by all the States by a general appropriation for travel both to camps and scenes of public disturbance. For District and National encampments transportation should be provided by the General Government. The cost would doubtless be somewhat heavier than is now incurred by State Governments, as the inducements held out to the railroad companies by State encampments would be wanting. Taking the Ninth District composed of Illinois and Indiana, the total mileage to be traversed for a District encampment may be estimated at about 810,000,⁵³ which would give at one cent per mile a cost of \$8,100, and at two cents, \$16,200. In like manner the mileage of five thousand troops for the National Encampments may be estimated at \$185,000 at one cent and \$870,000 at two cents per mile.

For the National Encampment and the twelve District encampments there would be required for transportation of men, baggage, horses and ordnance, an appropriation of one million dollars.

Recapitulating, we should require for

Pay of 5000 troops in National Encampment, 21 days and 5 days allowed for travel—26 days.....	\$136,500
Pay of 33,000 troops in District Encampment, 14 days.....	485,100
Pay of 62,000 troops in State camps, 10 days.....	623,100
Subsistence, 5000 men 26 days.....	32,500
Subsistence, 33,000 men 14 days.....	115,000
Subsistence, 62,000 men 10 days.....	155,000
Transportation.....	1,000,000
Horse hire, fuel, forage, straw, incidental expenses.....	500,000
Monthly drills and schools in armories.....	350,000
Total.....	\$3,366,700

An appropriation of three million dollars would insure the successful inauguration of the system indicated, which time and experience would develop and perfect.

RIFLE PRACTICE.

No special reference has been made to this subject. Its effectual accomplishment, especially in cities and in the Northern States in winter months, and where proper armory facilities are wanting, is beset with many difficulties. Much, however, has been accomplished in this direction by State troops, notably in Massachusetts,⁵⁴ Connecticut⁵⁵ and New York.⁵⁶ It should certainly be fostered by the General Government, and for this pur-

pose suitable prizes should be awarded in each District, and the men making the best shots in the Reserve—not exceeding one hundred—should be ordered to the National encampment and organized as a company of sharpshooters. The practical wisdom of attempting annual field maneuvers without at the same time providing for some theoretical instruction may be doubted. The citizen-officer, however, has very little time to go to school. By the time he receives his commission his school days are over; but it is believed that a system not unlike that of Canada⁷ might be found practicable, whereby a select number of the more promising and ambitious young officers of the Reserve should receive instruction in a course of studies relating to the particular arm of the service to which they belonged. For this purpose a limited number of subalterns from the Reserve—say one or two from each District—should be detailed, after satisfactory examinations as to their qualifications, for duty at the various schools of application. For the instruction of officers of higher rank, and those who would be unable to separate themselves for long periods from their usual vocations, a military college should be established in each District for an annual session of one month. One officer from each regiment in the District should be detailed, by judicious selection and with an alternate, for this course.

Instruction should be had principally by lecture and in the solution and discussion of problems in minor tactics, and upon hypothetical situations based upon the military geography of the District. All officers of the Reserve, so desiring, should be admitted to this course, but only those detailed should be “on duty” and receive pay.

TRANSFERS.

Finally, it might be found practicable to reduce the high per cent. of losses now arising from the continuous westward movement of the young men of the country by transfers. But a large share of these losses, especially in the West, is due to change of residence to towns having no military organization. This cannot be remedied. No discharge, however, should be granted for non-residence merely; every man should be retained on the rolls his full enlistment period, and subject to call in case of actual War.

CONCLUSION.

The investigations made by the writer in the preparation of

this paper disclose the fact that little can be proposed claiming the merit of originality, yet they have equally led him to the conviction that the system herein outlined will be found the only practicable plan which can be devised. No government ever instituted among men was so sensitive to the touch of the people as ours. To give promise to success, therefore, our Reserve must be popular, for in matter of defense our legislators are exceeding loth to move, and, indeed, seem already to have arrived at that melancholy state anticipated by De Tocqueville, in which they "regard every new theory as a peril, every innovation as an irksome toil, every social improvement as a stepping-stone to revolution, and so refuse to move altogether for fear of being moved too far."⁵⁸

Since the days when the fathers instituted the Militia system of 1792, we have advanced to the foremost rank among nations, standing first in wealth, first in production of brain and hand, in invention, manufactures and agriculture and first in the excess of national revenues over expenditures. Of forty-two principal nations, only one-half have receipts in excess of expenditures and the annual surplus of the United States exceeds the aggregate of all other nations.⁵⁹ What madness to be last in the security of our national defenses!

"An industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation," says Adam Smith, "is, of all nations, the most likely to be attacked, and unless the State takes some new measures for the public defense, the natural habits of the people render them incapable of defending themselves."

Landsturm 54.

NOTE.—*For the Notes pertaining to the Prize Essay see "Appendix" to this JOURNAL.*

NOTES. "PRIZE ESSAY."

See p. 1.

1. Fundamental Constitution of Carolina of 1669.
2. American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. 1.
3. "Civilization in America"—Nineteenth Century Magazine.
4. Democracy in America,—Appendix W.
5. The legal distinction between war and insurrection and invasion should be noted. "Insurrection is not war and invasion is not war. The Constitution expressly distinguishes them and treats them as wholly different subjects. * * * * War is matter of law and not merely of fact." U. S. Supreme Court, December Term, 1862. Prize Cases.
6. The Congressional consent was withdrawn in 1867, when nine States were prohibited from keeping an organized militia.
7. The Legislature of Massachusetts as early as 1830 had granted conditional exemptions to all persons above thirty years.
8. American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. IV.
9. Towards the close of President Van Buren's administration, Mr. Poinsett, then Secretary of War, prepared a plan for dividing the entire territory of the United States into Military Districts. This plan was sanctioned by the President and forwarded to Congress with his approval. The memorable Campaign of 1840 followed soon after, and the Whigs magnified the measure into such horrible proportions of military despotism that it undoubtedly became, in the West at least, one of the elements of Mr. Van Buren's defeat.
10. The following is the preamble to the Constitution of the "Frederick County Sharpshooters," organized at Frederick City, Maryland, during the War of 1812:

"Having taken into consideration our situation as freemen at this present alarming crisis, when the yeomanry are called forth by draft and in classes to defend our shores from an invading foe, and thereby often falling into the company of men disagreeable, and under officers who are strangers to the men and the men strangers to them, thereby making the service disagreeable to both officers and men, the following constitution is adopted for the good government of those patriotic citizens who may be ready to assist in the common defence."—Private Papers.

Some of these early organizations are still in existence, among which we may mention the "Republican Blues" of Savannah, organized May 1, 1808, "The Georgia Hussars," 1815, the "Cleveland (O.) Grays," 1837.
11. The writer remembers when a child the feelings of awe and veneration with which he contemplated a pile of rusty sabres of prodigious size and weight discovered by him in his grandfather's attic.
12. Annual Report Adjutant-General of New York, 1887.
13. The last Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of Conn. (1887) shows 1007 enlisted men discharged out of a force of 2337. Of this number 410 men were lost by non-residence. In New Jersey "about 15 per cent. of the force changes every year."—Annual Report Adjutant-General New Jersey, Oct. 31, 1887. In the 47th New York Regiment in 1885 over 50 per cent. of the enlisted men had served but one year or less."—Annual Report Adjutant-General, New York, 1886, p. 191. In Ohio and other Western States the annual losses amount to fully forty per cent.
14. Senate Bill 3343, introduced last July by Senator Manderson, by request, "to provide for the organization and maintenance of the National Guard." Mr. Manderson stated that he was not in favor of the measure.

15. Estimated from Official Reports of Adjutants-General and other sources. Connecticut has paid for erection of armories \$300,000.—Annual Report, 1887. Cincinnati is now building an armory at a cost of \$100,000, and many others rivalling those of the Eastern States are now projected in the West.

16. The annual appropriations of the various States, however, cover but a small portion of the required outlay. Armory rents and repairs, care of arms, janitors' wages, gas, fuel, furniture, and many other items are provided for by the counties, or by contributing membership, fines, etc. Following are the appropriations in round numbers of States:

New York.....	\$350,000	Michigan.....	\$54,000
Pennsylvania.....	220,000	Iowa.....	35,000
Illinois.....	165,000	R. I., besides uniforms.....	24,000
Massachusetts.....	156,000	Minnesota.....	20,000
Ohio.....	111,000	Maine, besides uniforms....	16,000
Connecticut.....	110,000	Nebraska.....	10,000
California.....	89,000		

All the other States except West Virginia and Missouri make appropriations more or less liberal.—See Adjutant-General's Report, State of Missouri, 1886.

17. This policy, says Sir Charles Dilke, is characteristic of the English race.—*"The British Army."*

18. A commutation tax of \$2, is assessed in Connecticut, aggregating in 1886 over \$109,000.—Annual Report Adjutant-General, Connecticut, 1887. In Michigan and Ohio each captain is permitted to enroll 150 contributing members, who shall pay into the Company not less than five (in Michigan ten) dollars per annum, receiving therefor a certificate of exemption from jury duty. In Virginia and Illinois, a permanent military fund is created by taxation.

19. The Militia is the whole male population capable of bearing arms, whether enrolled or not. In a recent case in the U. S. Supreme Court said: "It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the Reserve military force or Reserve Militia of the United States, as well as of the States."—*Presser vs. People*, 116 U. S. Reports 252.

20. Returns of the regularly enlisted, organized and uniformed active Militia of the United States, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 2, 1888.

21. In Massachusetts, New York and Illinois, the soldier is sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and in Michigan and Ohio the obligation to *serve* them is added. In Louisiana all officers take the same oath as is prescribed for the Army. Like provisions may be found in other States.

22. The reports of the Adjutants-General of nearly all the States show that applications are continually being received for permission to form new companies.

23. The massing of troops in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion is sufficiently secured by Sections 1642, 5297, 5298, 5299 Revised Statutes of the United States. The authority to decide when the exigency is sufficiently grave to call for troops "belongs exclusively to the President. His decision is conclusive upon all other persons."—*Martin vs. Mott*, U. S. Supreme Court, 12 Wheaton. The President is also authorized to issue his orders direct to any militia officer he may think proper. But whether the National Guard as now organized would in all cases be willing to regard themselves as first for duty beyond the borders of their respective States may be doubted. The Adjutant-General of New Jersey, referring to this subject, says, "I am not one of those who think that our National Guard, as at present constructed, is expected or will be required, unless in a dire necessity and for a very brief period, to leave the bounds of this State."—Annual Report, 1887.

24. "The Army of the United States," by Gen. J. A. Garfield, *North American Review*, May, 1878.

25. Col. Closson's Report on National Guard of New York, Aug. 31, 1885.

26. The Adjutant-General of Michigan, in his report for 1885-6, says, "An inspector should be the ideal soldier; not only a capable and educated tactician, but one endowed with force and energy to make his personality felt throughout the command. It goes without saying that there should be no part of the soldier's business with which he is not familiar in all its details, and upon which he will not be an accepted authority. To accomplish the best results he must be dignified and firm in his intercourse with the companies, and so thoroughly educated and equipped for his duties as to be self-reliant and confident in his own ability, while by his perfect poise he can command the confidence and win the respect of the officers whose work he will be called upon to criticise and correct. It would be well if an army officer could be detailed to each State to devote his time to the inspection and instruction of the State troops. The beneficial effects of such a thing cannot be overestimated. It would bring into closer relations the Regulars and Militia, making of each an integral part of one national army."

The Adjutant-General of Ohio, in acknowledging the services of officers detailed to inspect the camp, says, "By their cheerful, able and willing assistance they have won the lasting gratitude of all the officers and men in the Ohio National Guard;" and the Adjutant-General of Connecticut writes, "The detail of these officers * * * and their intelligent and thorough methods, were of the greatest value to the National Guard, and more than realized my expectations."—*Annual Reports*, 1887.

27. Should all the organizations in existence be accepted we should have a force of over 100,000 men, which is deemed as large as the people would be willing to maintain. As the Reserve gained in popularity the force would be gradually increased.

28. Independent companies are generally regarded as injurious to the regular Militia.

29. In New Hampshire the Field officers nominate the Captains and Lieutenants to the Governor. (Const. of New Hampshire.) In Louisiana all officers are appointed by the Governor, but with slight variations, the system outlined is found in every State in the Union.

30. Section 1856 Revised Statutes provides that Justices of the Peace and all general officers of the Militia shall be elected by the people in such manner as the respective legislatures may provide by law.

31. "A Service of Love"—Gen. Lloyd S. Bryce, *North American Review*, Sept., 1887.

32. Examinations are now required in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, Ohio, Illinois and many other States.

33. This is a statutory provision in most of the States and should in no case be relaxed. The Adjutant-General of California in his last report says: "I regret to say that within the last two years, three or four cases of embezzlement or gross misappropriations of State moneys have been revealed." A similar case occurred in Iowa. The execution of a bond would cure this and shield honorable officers from unmerited suspicion.

34. Recruitment is prohibited by special order in some of the States within a period of three months next preceding the encampment, but the facilities for drill are so limited in small armories that many of the men appear illy prepared for camp life. The enlistment period varies in the several States. In New York, Virginia, Illinois and Minnesota, it is five years; in Louisiana, four; in Alabama, Ohio and Michigan, three.

35. The average age of Colonels in the National Guard of one of the larger States recently ascertained was 44. Captains, 34. Subalterns and enlisted men, 26.

36. Col. Closson's, Report, August 31, 1885.

37. The Dress Uniform of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and other western States, is almost identical with that of the U. S. Service.

38. The officer who inspected the Massachusetts camps in 1886, says in reference to this subject: "The earthwork at South Framingham, has been of great service but does not meet the requirements of a regiment designated for heavy artillery instruction. More instruction in details is absolutely necessary, and it is impossible for the various companies or even detachments to visit South Framingham for this purpose as often as is necessary."

39. In Alabama, a fine of \$30 may be assessed for absence from drill. In South Carolina, officers may be fined \$20, and enlisted men, \$10, and in Michigan, \$4 is levied. See also States of New York, Ohio and Illinois.

40. An English writer referring to the necessity for a money allowance to the militiamen, says: "Excellent as the system of volunteer soldiery is, there must be a limit to the expense and risk which men can be expected voluntarily to incur. It is, I believe, the absence of some small daily payment to the volunteer cavalry which would have enabled the men partially to meet the heavy expenses necessarily entailed upon them by ten days in quarters, that has caused the collapse of so many corps."

41. In Wisconsin each man receives a per diem of \$2.50. In Massachusetts, \$2.00 is paid to enlisted men, \$2.50 to company officers, and \$4.00 to Field, Staff and General officers, and \$4.00 is allowed for horse hire. In New York, a private receives \$1.25, a non-commissioned officer \$1.50; Lieutenants, \$2.50; Captains, \$3.00; Lieut.-Colonels and Majors, \$4.00; Colonels, \$5.00; and Brigadier-Generals, \$6.00. In Ohio, one dollar is paid to enlisted men, and a gradual increase according to rank to officers. In Michigan, enlisted men receive \$1.25 and a colonel \$3.17. Alabama pays 50 cents to enlisted men and \$2.00 to officers. In Illinois, all officers and men receive one dollar per day regardless of rank.

42. Perhaps a more equitable rate would be that now prescribed for the Army, but this would not secure the men.

43. While there is manifest a general and earnest desire among the States for governmental co-operation, the States are still jealous of their prerogatives, and would not welcome any abridgement of their authority. The Adjutant-General of New Jersey writes, "It is a quite doubtful matter whether our Guard would favor the placing of its encampments under the control, direction and entire expense of the General Government. Our people seem to be willing to bear the expense incident to the disciplining of a force upon which they can rely in extreme moments. We have never sought for any direct control of our force or of our camps by officers of rank of the General Government, nor do I think that while we have in commission in this State general officers and regimental and battalion officers who have seen much of hard service in the Civil War, that they will for one moment consent to waive the responsibilities and duties of their office, and substitute in their room and place an officer of the General Government who may perchance in war times have commanded a company, and who never to this hour has had a thousand men under his direct control." We perceive, however, a ray of hope in the evident dissent from these views by the Inspector-General of the State, who says, "I hope the National Government will soon relieve the State of a great part of the expense of supporting the National Guard; it is eminently proper that this should be done. * * * A concerted movement is now on foot looking to this end, and which in my opinion should meet with universal approval and support."

44. The District camps would contain from 3000 to 5000 troops, except in the 7th District, which with present force would furnish about 1500.

45. Plan proposed for Camps of Instruction, Dept. of the Platte, Circular 2, Omaha, March 6, 1888.

46. The great mortality due to disease among volunteer troops is well known. In the War of the Rebellion 220,000 died from disease as against 110,000 by violence.

47. Col. Closson, referring to the Medical Department in New York in his report to the Adjutant-General, says, "The same exact and complete organization that has characterized all the Staff Departments is fully exemplified here, and was throughout the most prominent feature that came under my notice, and deserves special remark as showing the readiness and efficiency with which New York could put its military force into the field, with the whole system in good working order, by which their wants are to be manifested and provision made therefor."

48. States having too small a force to form a brigade, would be brigaded with adjacent States of the same district. •

49. These provisions are found in many of the States, but not in all.

50. A constant rotation would be thus secured, those in National Encampment this year going back to State Encampment next year, to compete again for District camp.

51. The appropriation for transportation of the Ohio National Guard in 1887, was \$14,555, of which \$9,293 was expended.—Annual Report.

52. The Missouri troops were transported to and from camp gratuitously by the Missouri Pacific Railway Company. "though not perhaps without the expectation of increased travel likely to be attracted by the extensively advertised sham battle, and of consequent indirect compensation: other roads, not counting on such incidental benefit, charged one cent and in some cases two cents per mile per man."—Major Schwan's Report, 1886. Sunday excursion trains from all parts of the surrounding country are a familiar feature in connection with State camps.

53. Official Table of Distances, War Department, 1881.

54. The Adjutant-General of Massachusetts, says in his Annual Report for 1887: "It is with pleasure I record for the second time that the team selected from the Militia by the efficient Inspector-General of Rifle Practice, Col. Horace T. Rockwell, has won the first prize and also the Hilton trophy at Creedmoor by the highest score ever attained at this match."

55. All State armories in Connecticut are now supplied with good rifle ranges.—Report Adjutant-General, Connecticut, 1887.

56. The New York Statutes provide that State prizes, \$100 in value, shall be awarded annually to that Regiment or Battalion showing the greatest proficiency in each Division, and a \$500 prize to the Regiment making the best record in the State. \$1,500 per year is authorized for this purpose. Great interest is also observed in this instruction in Canada, where an annual appropriation of \$10,000 is made for the support of the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association.

57. The Deputy Minister of Militia and Defense, in his last annual report (January 1, 1888), says: "The various reports on the Royal Schools of Cavalry, Artillery, Mounted Infantry and Infantry, are very encouraging and show the beneficial results which have accrued to the Force by the military instruction that has been given to so many Militia officers."

58. Democracy in America, Vol. 2, page 323.

59. Maverick National Bank Manual, Boston, 1887.

60. Wealth of Nations.